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Introduction
Asset pricing theories explain risk premia on¯nancial assets as compensating investors for risk exposures or risks that investors cannot diversify. The theories di®er in their speci¯cation of these undiversi¯able or systematic risks. In the Sharpe (1964) , and Lintner (1965) Capital Asset Pricing Model investors are only exposed to the risks of the market portfolio. The Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976) has investors exposed to a¯nite set of factor risks. While in the consumption beta model of Merton (1973) and Breeden (1975) investors face real consumption risk. In these theories investors reduce risk by diversifying their portfolios across the universe of assets. This paper focuses on another dimension of diversi¯cation and the resulting asset pricing model, more akin to insurance. By aggregating across the risk exposures of a large number of investors we derive an asset pricing model that averages out many investor speci¯c concerns. Hence even if investors have to take positions in many speci¯c risks and diversi¯cation is incomplete at the individual investor level, many of these nondiversi¯ed risks need have no impact on the market prices of assets. For emphasis and exactness we model an economy with in¯nitely many investors, in which each single investor is insigni¯cant.
Formally, we de¯ne, in a general and abstract setting, the concept of investor speci¯c risk exposures in equilibrium in terms of measurability with respect to an appropriate investor speci¯c ¾¡algebra of events. We then identify these investor speci¯c risk exposures and relate them to personalized asset pricing models. An asset pricing model for the economy or a market asset pricing model is obtained by aggregating personalized asset pricing models across investors. The risk exposures compensated for in the market asset pricing model are similarly de¯ned in terms of measurability and termed market risk exposures. A precise relationship between market and investor speci¯c risk exposures modeled as ¾¡ algebras is also developed. The general model we present is abstract, but includes a range of examples. The general procedure of focusing on investor speci¯c risk exposures and the associated personalized asset pricing models and then averaging over the set of investors is suggestive and o®ers considerable guidance for future research into asset pricing. The important insight gained from our analysis is precisely the proposition that future work on asset pricing needs to focus on identifying and explaining investor speci¯c risk exposures across the pool of investors in addition to the more traditional focus on asset returns. Section 2 presents the economic model. Investor speci¯c risk exposures and the associated personalized asset pricing models are de¯ned in Section 3. The relationship between investor speci¯c and market risk exposures and personalized and market asset pricing models is presented in Section 4. Examples illustrating the theory for important special cases are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Economic Model
The economic model follows . There are two dates and an abstract set I of investors. The space of time 1 contingent cash°ows over which investors have preferences is modeled as a separable Hilbert space V: Let V = L 2 (; F; P ) be the space of¯nite second moment random variables de¯ned on the probability space (; F; P ) ; where is the set of events, F is a ¾¡ algebra of events and P is a probability measure. For generality we suppose that preferences are de¯ned over an attainable convex set X i ½ V:
Each investor i 2 I is supposed to have a monotone increasing, continuous and quasiconcave utility function u i de¯ned on X i :
1 Cash°ows at time 1 are obtained by holding assets at time 0: There are a¯nite set J of assets indexed by j; with claims to time 1 state contingent cash°ows Z j 2 V for all j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; J:
2 Let the vector a i denote investor i's holding of the J assets, the associated time 1 cash°ow is given by the linear operator
that maps R J into V: Each investor also has an initial endowment of assets of a i : It is easily shown that the set of feasible asset portfolios for i;
These induced preferences inherit the properties of being continuous and quasi-concave from u i and the linearity and continuity of the operator Z: Furthermore, we also suppose nonsatiation of u ¤ i or the absence of bliss points. Consider an economy with a countable in¯nity of investors.
3 One may therefore suppose, without loss of generality, that I; the index set for the investors, is the set of 1 The utility function could represent the utility of consuming the entire cash°ow at time 1 or it could represent the optimized utility of a dynamic program beginning at time 1. The utility function could also be used to represent the immediate one period objectives of institutional investors,¯rms or other members of the investing community.
2 Extending the results of this paper to the case of in¯nitely many assets ia an interesting and useful research problem. There are however technical di±culties associated with the double in¯nity of assets and investors. 3 We restrict to a countable in¯nity of individuals since the law of large numbers does not hold for a continuum, (See Judd(1983) , Feldman and Gilles (1985) ).
all natural numbers or positive integers. Since we wish to model individual investors as insigni¯cant in the in¯nite economy, we follow Aumann (1964) and Ostroy (1984) , by modeling investors as having zero measure. Accordingly we take the space of investors to be a¯nitely additive non-atomic measure space (I; A; ¹) ; where I is the set of positive integers, A is the algebra of all subsets of I and ¹ is a¯nitely additive measure that gives measure zero to all¯nite sets. 4 Only large and in particular in¯nite sets of individuals have positive measure. We normalize the population of investors and suppose that ¹(I) = 1; whereby ¹(A) is the proportion of investors in the set A:
The speci¯c choice of ¹ among the class of¯nitely additive non-atomic measures is not important for the general results we obtain. Di®erent choices correspond to di®erent limit economies. The measures of sets may be constructed as limits of weighted investor memberships in the set, with the limit taken over economies with¯nitely many investors, as the population size approaches in¯nity and simultaneously the weight of individual investors approaches zero. For further details on the construction of such¯nitely additive non-atomic measures on a countable set, the reader is referred to the Appendix. The theory of integration with respect to such measures is presented in Dunford and Schwartz (1988) and Leader (1953) . We note here that all bounded functions are integrable in the L 1 sense. Equilibrium theory for exchange economies in this context is studied by Weiss (1981) . We suppose that the endowment function a : I ! R J de¯ned by the endowments a i is ¹ integrable in i:
Equilibrium allocations for the limit economy, with¯nitely additive non-atomic measure space of investors, are unique up to perturbation by a null function. Formally, allocations are determined within equivalence classes with two allocations being equivalent if their di®erence is a null function. A function h(i) is said to be a null function if it has a norm integrating to zero, i.e. R kh(i)k d¹(i) = 0: In this regard note that there do exist strictly positive null functions. A function h(i) is null if, for all " > 0; the measure of the set of investors for which kh(i)k exceeds " is zero. So for example the function h(i) = 1=i is strictly positive and null. Null perturbations have no e®ect on the limits of average allocations taken over a sequence of economies with a population tending to in¯nity and the weighting of single investors approaching zero. It is precisely for this reason that, from the perspective of the limit economy, such perturbations are admissible without disturbing the limit equilibrium.
The de¯nition of equilibrium used by Weiss (1981) is in terms of these equivalence classes of allocations. Equilibria have the property that investors may deviate from their utility maximizing allocations by a null function without disturbing the market clearing condition of the limit economy. A competitive equilibrium for the asset exchange economy over the in¯nite set of investors I is de¯ned as follows:
De¯nition 2An attainable allocation is budget feasible for the price system p 2 R J if there exists a subset A µ I with ¹(A) = ¹(I) and a null function h : I ! R J such that
The de¯nition of budget feasibility permits individual exceptions to the budget constraint for a null set of investors and for a non-null set by a null aggregate.
De¯nition 3A competitive equilibrium is an attainable allocation a ¤ and a price system p ¤ such that a ¤ is budget feasible for p ¤ and for some subset A µ I ,¹(A) = ¹(I) and null functions h
This de¯nition of competitive equilibrium permits null function, h ¤ ; perturbations from a utility maximizing allocations with the resulting utilities also simultaneously perturbed by, k ¤ ; another null function. Such perturbations have no e®ect on the limit economy and cannot be detected in the limit economy.
For the existence of such an equilibrium we require an assumption of uniform continuity on the utility functions across both i and the allocations. Such an assumption would be satis¯ed if marginal utilities were bounded in absolute value. Assumption 1. For each " > 0; there exists ± > 0 such that ka ¡ bk · ± implies that ju
Theorem 4Under assumption 1, and supposing that J is¯nite there exists a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. (See Appendix)

Personalized Asset Pricing Models
Consider an Asset Exchange Economy in equilibrium as described in Section 2. For the purposes of this section we assume an appropriate di®erentiability of u i : In fact, we suppose that u i is the restriction to X i of a function that is Fr ¶ echet di®erentiable on an open set containing X i : This assumption enables us to de¯ne personalized marginal rates of substitution and identify, in Lemma 5 below, the structure of state contingent marginal utilities.
Lemma 5For each i, there exist random variables
a.e. in with respect to P; such that,
Proof. See Appendix. The random variables Ã i and Ã i 0 are the marginal utilities of state contingent cash°o ws evaluated at the cash°ows arising from the equilibrium and optimal asset holdings a Theorem 6For all i; the market price of traded assets p
Proof. Since u ¤ i is maximized for all i with respect to the budget constraint, the¯rst order condition implies that @u
The result follows from (2) 
The random variables¸i 0 ;¸i are state price functions (Du±e (1988) ) and de¯ne the state contingent discount to be applied to future or time 1 cash°ows in determining their contribution to current values. The linear operator © i de¯ned by (6) provides a personalized valuation of x by measuring the sacri¯ce in terms of time 0 wealth that will compensate investor i for giving up a marginal unit of the time 1 cash°ow x:
These personalized valuations of traded cash°ows
The next section presents su±cient conditions implying that personalized valuations and market prices di®er by a null function. Under these conditions, for all but¯nitely many investors, personalized valuations and market prices are arbitrarily close. We therefore have in the linear operators © i a sequence of personalized asset pricing linear operators. We now wish to propose, in a general and abstract setting, a de¯nition for the concept of investor speci¯c risk exposures in equilibrium. The basic intuition motivating this de¯nition is that we may treat investor i as unconcerned about the risk, or risk neutral in equilibrium, if it is the case that
In this case there are no risks that particularly concern investor i; we have risk neutrality at the margin for valuation.
More generally, we say that the ¾¡algebra G i characterizes investor i 0 s risk exposure in equilibrium if for all x;
; or investor i is indi®erent at the margin between x and E P £ x¯G i ¤ : Hence, if we have risk neutrality at the margin conditional on G i ; then investor speci¯c risk concerns are characterized by G i : A simple example illustrates the situation further. De¯ne a tree representing the uncertainty resolution of two equally likely Bernoulli outcomes. The¯rst represents good(G) or bad (B) health for the individual and the second represents cloudy (C) or sunny (S) weather conditions in some distant country. There are in all four equally states labeled GC; GS; BC; and BS respectively. Suppose a cash°ow x pays the amounts 1; 2; 3 and 4 thousand dollars in these four states. If the investor's equilibrium state price function turns out to be insensitive to weather conditions in the distant country but responsive to her state of health, with the state price function taking on for example the values 0:1; 0:1; 0:3; and 0:3 in the states GC; GS; BC and BS then the weather in the distant country is not a risk concern while her state of health is. The personal valuation of x; © i [x] is the same as the personal valuation of E P [x jstate of health ] ; or the cash°ow 1:5; 1:5; 3:5; and 3:5: The investor may be thought of as¯rst averaging out events with respect to which no risk adjustment turns out to be necessary in equilibrium, and then prices the resulting cash°ow, taking account of personally required risk compensations.
De¯nition 7The ¾¡algebra G i de¯nes investor i's risk exposure in equilibrium if G i is the smallest ¾¡ algebra satisfying
If the value of x to i; at the margin equals the value to i of the expectation of x conditional on G i ; then investor i is marginally, G i conditionally, risk neutral. Hence investor i 0 s risk concerns or relevant risk exposures are captured in the ¾¡algebra G i : The example motivating this de¯nition suggests that G i is related to the sensitivity of equilibrium marginal rates of substitution to events. This suggestion is con¯rmed in Theorem 8 below. Speci¯cally let F i = ¾(¸i) be the smallest ¾¡ algebra with respect to which¸i is measurable.
Proof. We¯rst show that G i µ F i : This is accomplished by showing that F i satis¯es the de¯ning condition of G i :
For the inclusion in the other direction, it follows from the de¯nition of G i ; that for all x
However, this implies that for all x; as G i µ F i and¸i is F i measurable that
for all x:Taking for x the random variable ¡¸i
Risk exposures of concern to investors in equilibrium are most generally and abstractly given by the ¾¡ algebra of events G i : Theorem 8 shows that this is precisely the ¾¡ algebra generated by the single random variable¸i; that essentially describes equilibrium personalized state prices of events. The key to understanding equilibrium asset pricing in terms of traditional factor model representations lies in describing the measurability of¸i in terms of some factors. Both linear and nonlinear factor representations of linear pricing rules given by¸i are possible.
Consider¯rst linear representations. Invoking the separability of V; let Q = fq k ; k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ g be a countable orthonormal basis for V: Since V is self dual,¸i is in the closed linear span of Q and we may write that¸i
De¯ne
as the set of basis elements that is actually required to span¸i: For purposes of simpli¯-cation or empirical approximation we may suppose that Q i is¯nite. Standard arguments now enable us to derive the personalized asset pricing model
where ¹ is the vector of asset mean returns on the traded assets,¯i is the matrix of assets betas with respect to the elements of Q i and°i 0 ;°i 1 are constants. Expression (8) is written as an approximation for this this economy on two counts. First, asset prices are approximately given by the operators © i ; with the di®erence being arbitrarily small for all but¯nitely many investors, and second an approximation may be involved in getting Q i to be¯nite. The number of factors involved in the linear representation (7) may be unduly large if¸i is in fact a nonlinear function of a few factors, say
where S 1 ; S 2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S K(i) are the K(i) factors needed to describe nonlinearly the variations in the measurability of¸i: Equation (8) provides us with a K(i) dimensional nonlinear representation of¸i: This may be further reduced to a linear model by introducing as separate factors the products of powers of the primary factors in the nonlinear representation. The representation (9) clearly subsumes (7) and allows for more powerful dimensional reductions of¸i at the cost of more complex associated asset pricing models as one loses the representation (8).
5
In summary, investor speci¯c risk concerns de¯ned by G i are identi¯ed as ¾(¸i) and result in the linear in factors personalized asset pricing models given by equation (8) or equivalently the nonlinear in factors representation (9) . These asset pricing models hold approximately for almost all investors in equilibrium for economies with a large number of investors.
The Systematic Risk Exposures
The risk exposures relevant to investor i in equilibrium are given by the ¾¡ algebras F i and yield approximate personalized asset pricing models with respect to the factors Q i for all i: The risks Q i are relevant for assessing the personalized valuations of cash°ows by individuals. On the other hand market risk exposures or systematic risks are risks that are relevant for assessing the market prices of securities or traded state contingent cash°ows. These risks will be shown to de¯ne a ¾¡ algebra M that is identi¯ed and related to the F i0 s or G i0 s in this section. In particular we shall observe that M can be considerably smaller than the union of the F i0 s: Alternatively, the factors present in the market asset pricing model can be smaller than the union of the Q i0 s: Many risk concerns relevant to particular investors in equilibrium can be eliminated from relevance for market valuation by the law of large numbers applied to the average of the personalized valuations procedures. In this sense the market can be viewed as an implicit insurer of personalized risk exposures and this insurer does not face the multitude of speci¯c risk concerns a®ecting the diverse population of the insured, by essentially an application of the law of large numbers.
It is¯rst established that the average of personalized values equals market prices. This is done by showing that the operator © i ¡ © i 0 is a null operator in that for all x; the function
is a null function of i: For this theorem we employ a condition on 5 We shall follow the more traditional representations (7) and (8) 
Proof. See Appendix Suppose Assumption 2 and let © be the average of the operators © i ; more precisely
The norm boundedness of © i under assumption 2 implies that © is a continuous linear functional on V and hence there exists¸such that
De¯ne M to be the smallest ¾¡ algebra with respect to which¸is measurable. We will show that unlike the operators © i ; © agrees with market prices for traded assets. Furthermore, there is a precise relationship between the ¾¡ algebra M and the ¾¡algebras (F i ; i 2 I); whereby M is considerably smaller than the union of the F i0 s: Hence, M is a candidate for a relatively parsimonious speci¯cation of market risk exposures or systematic risks.
Proof. For all traded assets j p
0 is a null operator by theorem (4), it follows that
Theorem 11M is contained in the asymptotic or tail algebra associated with the sequence
Proof. Let n be an integer and set
Since the¯nite set of integers 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n has zero measure, it follows that for all x
Hence,
or that for all x we have E
which implies that¸is H n measurable for all n and so the result follows. The inclusion (12) provides the relationship between market and systematic risks and the risk exposures relevant to individual investors. Formally, M, the ¾¡algebra of the market risks is contained in the tail algebra of the risks relevant to individual investors. The tail algebra can be considerably smaller than the union of the individual ¾¡ algebras ¾ ¡¸i¢ : Hence many risk factors relevant to individual investors need not be important in the market place for pricing assets. A su±cient condition useful in providing examples where M is considerably smaller is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 12If D µ F
i for all i and the sequence of ¾¡algebras F i are conditionally independent, conditional on D Then M = D:
Proof. This is a consequence of the conditional zero-one law (See Appendix). The variables de¯ning D measurability can be linked to risks accounted for in determining insurance premiums, the additional variables needed to de¯ne F i measurability are personal risks that the insurer avoids through aggregating across the pool of insurers. Hence, life insurance premiums may vary with smoking habits as this has been isolated as an important part of D, while many other factors a®ecting personal life risks, elements of F i ; are ignored for the purpose of setting life insurance premiums. If we de¯ne by Q M the basis elements needed to span¸in equation (11) then by standard arguments we may derive the exact asset pricing model ¹ =°0 +¯°1 (13) where¯is now the matrix of asset beta's with respect to the elements of Q M : Unlike expression (8), equation (13) is exact as the operator (11) gives asset prices exactly. Since M is contained in the tail algebra of the F i0 s the number of factors represented in (13) is expected to be considerably smaller than the union of all factors represented in the personalized asset pricing models.
Asset Pricing Examples
Our examples focus on two fundamental sources of investor speci¯c risk exposure in equilibrium. These are i) the e®ects of non-traded assets or endowment e®ects and ii) the e®ects of direct utility based variables. We specialize the probability space and suppose that F is generated by the following:
1.a set of K random variables, denoted S = (S 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S K ); 2.a sequence of investor speci¯c real random variables y i for all i 2 I; 3.a sequence of investor speci¯c vector random variables v i for all i 2 I:
4.a¯nite set of real random variables u j for j 2 J:
For the individual utility functions, we suppose that each investor i has a state preference utility function of the form
where w i denotes wealth at time 1 attained as a consequence of the portfolio held at time 0; and S,v i are state variables that a®ect the utilities of investor i: Each individual is also endowed with an initial holding of traded assets a i 2 R J ; i 2 I: We suppose that time 1 wealth re°ects the e®ects of both portfolio holdings and nontraded assets and so
De¯ne the linear projection of asset cash°ows on the space generated by the random variables S; by
where ® j is a constant,¯j is a K¡dimensional vector. The operator Z[a] can then be written
where ® is the vector of coe±cients ® j and B is a matrix with K rows¯j; j = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K:
The single investor's utility function may now be written as
It follows from the speci¯cation of u i and the Fr ¶ echet di®erentiability of u i with respect to the traded time 1 cash°ow w that the Fr ¶ echet di®erential of u i ; ±u i (w; h) takes the form
from which it follows that investor i 0 s state price function has the form
where ¤ i = Ã i =°i 0 : The risk factors priced by investor i in equilibrium are therefore given by
where ¾(X) refers to the smallest ¾¡ algebra with respect to which the vector of variables X is measurable. Within this general framework we can discuss a number of special cases that have received attention in the literature. First consider models in which both v i and y i are absent. For example, Ross (1976), Connor(1984) , discuss the diversi¯cation of the idiosyncratic components u 0 a i by essentially setting out conditions under which each u 0 a i is zero for each i: The factors then reduce to S with no necessity of invoking a law of large numbers. The associated conditions on preferences and asset returns are however quite strong. Milne (1988) also discusses approximate asset pricing models with u 0 a i approaching zero as the number of assets approaches in¯nity.
Another line of attack is exempli¯ed by the work of Grinblatt and Titman (1983) and Dybvig (1983) . This approach obtains approximate asset pricing models by bounding the sensitivity of¸i to u 0 a i via preference restrictions but allows u 0 a i to be possibly non-zero. In the light of theorem 11, however, and recognizing that one may aggregate over the set of investors in obtaining asset pricing models we observe that it is not necessary that investors be able to diversify away¯rm speci¯c risks completely to the point that u 0 a i is equal to zero. In fact letting " i = u 0 a i + y i we have thaţ
( 1 7 ) and provided (v i ; " i ) are conditionally independent given S; theorem 7 implies that¸is S measurable, M = ¾(S) and we may writȩ
A particularly interesting special case is obtained on specializing further. Suppose that L i represents the e®ects on wealth of labor income, a typically undiversi¯able component for most investors. Let the utility function be a indirect utility of nominal wealth w i and a personalized price index p i that takes account of personalized expenditure tastes. Hence we may write that¸i
In order to invoke theorem 7 we need to specify the factors S: For this purpose consider a vector of portfolios with returns S that are useful in predicting investor speci¯c labor incomes and price indices by the regression models,
Substituting back into (19) we obtaiņ
Now perform the regression (16) and substitute into (20) to obtain the form (17) . To derive (18) we require conditional independence of (u 0 a i + y i ; v i ) conditional on S: This might require us to expand s to include portfolios that are useful in predicting Z j in the regression (16) even though they may not be signi¯cant in explaining L i or p i : Under multivariate normality of (S; u; y; v) the conditional independence follows from the orthogonality of (u; y; v) and S obtained on the three regressions for Z j ; L i ; p i :
The factors relevant for asset pricing suggested by our model of an asset exchange economy include those factors that explain the cross sectional variation across investors of e®ects on marginal utilities or the investor speci¯c duals¸i: This may usefully be contrasted with the more traditional approach of focusing solely on explaining the cross sectional variation across assets of asset returns. The important insight into asset pricing gained from our analysis is precisely the proposition that empirical work on asset pricing needs to focus on factors relevant in explaining the investor speci¯c pricing duals¸i across i in addition to identifying factors explaining Z j across the set of assets.
Once we have established the validity of (18) for some set of factors S; a traditional K factor approximate asset pricing model may be derived by invoking a¯rst order approximation to the function ¤ using familiar arguments (See Breeden (1979) , Grossman and Shiller (1982) , Madan (1988) , and Back (1991) ).
Theorem 13The market pricing operator ©[Z] may be approximated by
Proof. By the de¯nition of ©;
Now write the expectation of the product ¤Z as the product of the expectations plus the covariance of ¤ and Z to get
Now approximate ¤ by a¯rst order Taylor series expansion about 0 the expectation of the S 0 i s;
where ¤ k refers to the partial of ¤ with respect to S k : The result follows on substituting (23) into (22) and noting that ± = E P [¤] and µ k = ¤ k : Theorem 8 provides a K¡ systematic factor asset pricing model in which covariances with the variables S 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S K determine risk premia. By the usual arguments this may be written as a beta pricing model for expected asset returns in which just the beta's with respect to S 1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; S K are priced.
The approach to obtaining asset pricing models as averages of personalized asset pricing models can hopefully be used to derive relatively parsimonious but successful asset pricing models. At an empirical level, the approach is suggestive and o®ers guidance into directions that may fruitfully be taken in future research on empirical asset pricing models.
Conclusion
Asset pricing in equilibrium is conducted by investors who are in agreement about the prices of traded assets. The reasons for this agreement however, are varied, typically re°ecting investor speci¯c risk exposures that arise from incomplete diversi¯cation of personal risks across the space of assets. Personalized investor speci¯c asset pricing models re°ect the multitude of these risks. By averaging across the pool of investors, in a manner akin to how insurers average risks across the pool of the insured, market risk exposures and asset pricing models are derived. It is observed on invoking a law of large numbers applied to an in¯nite population of investors that many personally relevant risk considerations can be eliminated from the market asset pricing model.
Examples illustrating the e®ects of undiversi¯ed labor income and taste speci¯c price indices are provided. An important insight into asset pricing gained from our analysis is the proposition that work on asset pricing needs to focus on identifying and explaining investor speci¯c risk exposures cross sectionally across the pool of investors in addition to explaining the variation of asset cash°ows. In this sense the approach outlined here is jointly focused on both the pricing dual and the primal aspects of asset cash°ows.
APPENDIX
7.1 Details on The Construction of Non-Atomic Finitely Additive Measures on the set of Natural Numbers.
Two general strategies for the construction of¯nitely additive measures with zero measure for¯nite sets are described in Madan and Owings (1988) . We present here two examples that illustrate these constructions.
Example 1.
Let A k be a sequence of pairwise disjoint in¯nite subsets of the set of natural numbers whose union is the set of all natural numbers. For example A 1 could be the even numbers while the union of all the other sets is the odd numbers. One could then partition the odd numbers into two in¯nite sets A 2 and the complement of A 1 [ A 2 : The sequence A k can then be generated by repeated partitioning. Now let p k be any positive sequence of numbers that satis¯es P 1 k=1 p k = 1: De¯ne the binary valued sequence of set functions ± k on the collection of all subsets of I by
Since no¯nite set can contain all but¯nitely many elements of any A k ± k (A) is zero for all¯nite sets for all k; hence ¹(A) = 0: However, though¯nite sets have zero measure, this measure ¹ has the feature that for example, A 1 with ¹(A 1 ) = p 1 ; cannot be partitioned into sets of measure less than p 1 and hence the measure is atomic with the sets A k serving as the atoms.
Example 2.
In this construction we obtain a¯nitely additive non-atomic measure that is the limit of measures relevant for¯nite economies and re°ects the limits of averages.
We¯rst de¯ne a sequence of¯nitely additive measures ¹ n on the set of all subsets of I as follows:
¹ n (A) = jA \ L(n)j n where L(n) = fk j1 · k · n g ; jXj denotes the cardinality of the set X; and ¹ n is the proportion of elements less than or equal to n that belong to A: it is clear that ¹ n is a¯nitely additive measure on the set of all subsets of I: Since ¹ n is a function from A the set of all subsets of I into the unit interval I; we may think of ¹ n as an element of the set I A : If we endow I A with the product topology of the Euclidean topology on I then I
A is a compact set by Tychono®'s theorem. Therefore the set f¹ n jn 2 I g has an accumulation point ¹: Note that ¹(A) = lim n ¹ n (A) whenever this limit exists. Hence, since for all¯nite sets A; lim n ¹ n (A) = 0 the measure ¹ is zero on all¯nite sets.
For the¯nite additivity of ¹; suppose that A 1 and A 2 are two disjoint sets with A = A 1 [ A 2 : Since ¹ is an accumulation point there exists a subsequence ¹ n k such that lim n k ¹ nk (A 1 ) = ¹(A 1 ); lim n k ¹ nk (A 2 ) = ¹(A 2 ) and lim n k ¹ nk (A) = ¹(A): Now by thē nite additivity of ¹ n we have that for all k
and it follows on taking limits that
To observe that ¹ is non-atomic, observe that for each m we may de¯ne sets C 1 ; C 2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ C m such that k 2 C i just if i = 1 + k mod(m): For each i and n equal to mN; ¹ n (C i ) = 1 m ; while for n exceeding mN; we have that
Since as n and N tend to in¯nity these upper and lower bounds converge to 1 m ; it follows that ¹ n (C i ) converges to 
where all the sets ¹(A \ C i ) have measure bounded by 1 m which for large enough m is less than p 2 : Hence A has two disjoint subsets with positive measure strictly less than p and hence A is not an atom.
The measure ¹(A) re°ects the asymptotic proportion of the population in the set A: In fact if ¹(A) = p > 0 then for any " > 0 it must be the case that for in¯nitely many n jA\L(n)j n is within " of p:
Proof of Theorem 4.
The theorem is proved by establishing the equivalence under assumption 1 between a competitive equilibrium and the Weiss (1981) de¯nition of a competitive equilibrium, termed here a WCE for a Weiss competitive equilibrium. The proof is completed by noting that a WCE exists (Weiss (1981) The existence of competitive equilibrium for such an economy can be established using a modi¯cation of the arguments in Weiss to account for short sales along the lines of Milne (1976) .
We now establish the equivalence between a competitive equilibrium and a WCE under assumption 1.
Suppose¯rst that we have a competitive equilibrium. Therefore there exists A µ I; ¹(A) = ¹(I) and h ¤ i ; k i null functions satisfying ; and so A and A n are conditionally independent given D: Therefore, P (A jD )P (A n jD ) > P (A jD ) and so P (A jD That is C = D:
